

**Sudanese Association for Combating Landmines
(JASMAR)**

**Report on Strategic Plan
(2006 – 2011)**

**Workshop convened in Holiday Villa
14th August 2006**

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1. List of acronyms:

APL	Anti-Personnel Landmines
BN	Blue Nile
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DCA	Danish Church Aid
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration of ex-combatants
ED	Executive Director
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
GM	General Manager
GONU	Government Of National Unity
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
HMA	Humanitarian Mine Action
IDPs	Internally Displaced Populations
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
LM	Landmines
LMA	Landmines Action UK
MA	Mine Action
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MRE	Mine Risk Education
MRR	Mines Risk Reduction
NM	Nuba Mountains
NMAO	National Mine Action Office
NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organization
OSIL	Operation Save Innocent Lives
PSC	Project Support Cost
PWDs	People With Disabilities
RFH	Rufaida Health Organization
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SC Sweden	Save the Children Sweden
SCBL	Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines
SLADO	Sudan Landmines Action and Development Organization
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures.
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service

2. Acknowledgment:

The JASMAR strategic planning workshop wouldn't have been possible without the demonstrable political support at the highest level of participation of the NMAO director, the DDR commissioner and HAC commissioner general. Sincere gratitude goes to Mr. Awad Bashir, Dr. Solafeddin Salih and Mr. Hasabo Mohamed Abdul Rahman, respectively.

I am greatly indebted to Mr, Dave Took of LMA who kindly accepted to facilitate the workshop, despite the short notice, and diligently coached the proceeding in a professional manner that culminated to the success of the workshop,

Special gratitude goes to Dr, Solafeddin Salih for his financial contribution to the cost of the workshop. Without such support we couldn't have, in the first place, ensured the participation of our field representatives from Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.

I should like at this juncture to salute Mr. Abdulatie Abdulkheir, the SCBL coordinator, for reflecting the highlights of the newly produced national mine action strategy of the Sudan Government.

JASMAR will continue to thank Ms. Valeria Fabroni of MAG for her continuous and relentless efforts to train JASMR staff on the organization management skills. More recent, is the training session which preceded this workshop on developing JASMAR conceptual frame of operation and strategic thinking.

Last, but not least, thanks to all participants who showed all the enthusiasm, willingness and patience for the whole long day. Thanks for the fruitful discussion, useful debate and participatory thinking.

3. Executive summary:

JASMAR was established as a result of a demand driven situation at a time where a national capacity on mine clearance was lacking. JASMAR activities were dictated by the context of conflict, hampered by all the intricacies of scepticism and lack of confidence. By then, there was no clear national mine action policy, no national instruments in place and Sudan did not accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.

While Sudan have reached a settlement of the two decades civil war (the main reason for landmines use), spontaneous movement of returnees through front lines and mined areas will risk an increase in landmine casualties.

However, the whole operational context has changed now. Sudanese parties to the conflict have signed a CPA, Sudan government have acceded to the MBT and a national mine action authority have been established as well as a national mine action strategy have been declared. JASMAR now has a record of 5 years field experience and successful partnership with national and international counterparts. As the year 2011 had set an ultimatum for the Southerners to vote for self-determination, inter alia, JASMAR has deemed it necessary to proactively develop a strategy plan for the upcoming 5 years.

Without solid data-base and sound information about the magnitude of landmine across Sudan a successful national program can never be attained. Unfortunately this challenge is likely to continue for some time.

Guided by its internal values and declared principles, JASMAR has set a vision of dreaming of a durable peace in Sudan that is free of the scourge of the ERW and enjoying sustainable livelihoods. JASMAR has stated a mission to realize that through contributing to the recovery and development of mine affected areas and consolidating peace in Sudan by implementing humanitarian mine action and ensuring meaningful engagement of the communities and participation of the partners. JASMAR 5 year's strategy has set the following strategic goals:

- JASMAR to become an independent recognized and accredited lead mine action agency in Sudan.
- JASMAR to become a regional resource in Africa for initiation of cross-line/cross-border MA programs.
- JASMAR is to establish alliances with like-minded human security programs like the DDR and SALW control.
- JASMAR is to effectively contribute to peace building and socio-economic recovery of mine affected communities as well as advocating for the rights of the people with disabilities (PWDs).

However, delay in implementation of the CPA and/or MBT may affect the conducive environment created for combating landmines in Sudan. The global emergencies may distract donors' attention and negatively impact resource mobilization. Emerging conflicts in other parts of Sudan and human rights atrocities are likely to pre-empt sustained funding. Nonetheless, national capacities for planning, implementation and

monitoring mine action across the country remain to be the underlying problem. Managerial and operational capacity development should top the priority agenda. While Sudan government should allocate sizable budget contribution to mine action, efforts should be exerted to tap resources from non-conventional, western sources.

4. Overview:

Antipersonnel mines were used extensively in Sudan's two decades of civil conflict with the SPLM/A in southern Sudan, and in the three so-called conflict areas in northern Sudan (the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Blue Nile). Mines were also allegedly used in recent years along Sudan's borders with Chad, Eritrea, Libya and Uganda.

Sudan signed the mine ban treaty on December 4th 1997. Sudan signing the convention despite its security concerns which are well known to all, stems from its deep conviction and its strong belief that humanity should get rid of such dangerous weapons threatens the lives of innocent population. The treaty was ratified on October 23rd 2003 and came in to force on April 1st 2004. The treaty now commits Sudan to destroying its stock by April 1st 2008, de-mining all affected areas by April 1st 2014 and to report to the UN Secretary General on measures taken to implement the treaty (initial report) by October 1st 2004.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement incorporates previous agreements between the government and SPLM/A that explicitly prohibit use of all landmines. An agreement reached on 31 December 2004 states that the "laying of mines, explosive devices or booby traps of whatever type shall be prohibited." Under a memorandum of understanding on cessation of hostilities reached in October 2002, both parties agreed to "cease laying of landmines. The government and SPLM/A also agreed to stop using mines since January 2002 Nuba Mountains cease-fire agreement.

However, by 2011 Southern Sudan have got the right to vote for self determination.

In addition, a humanitarian cease-fire for Darfur, signed in Chad in April 2004, provides that the parties shall stop laying landmines, and mark and post any minefields. The parties to the conflict, the two rebel groups—Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—and the Sudanese government, are to assure that all forces under their control comply with the agreement.

The size of the country (four times that of France), the lack of data and reliable information, and the shortage of systematic surveys makes it difficult to establish the extent of contamination by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Sudan with any precision. Available information indicates that the south generally faces a larger problem than the north, and that landmines are in general a lesser problem than ERW (comprising abandoned ordnance – AXO, and unexploded ordnance – UXO) both in the south and north. However, road access in both parts of the country is hampered by the suspected presence of mines. In December-2005, the Sudan mine action program recorded 957 dangerous areas.

Antipersonnel and anti vehicle mines as well as other types of munitions were an integral part of the conflict, and were used by both the government of Sudan (GOS) and SPLM/A forces. According to various assessments, anti vehicle mines were mainly used on roads

by SPLM/A to restrict GOS forces' movements and access to towns. GOS used antipersonnel landmines defensively to protect its garrison towns and to prohibit movement of insurgent forces.

The presence of mines on roads in the north and south has restricted access by aid agencies and increased the cost of food and non-food items. The World Food Program estimates that food security for two million people is directly affected by mines. Landmines and ERW is also a serious obstacle to reconstruction projects.

Mines and ERW affect the following states in particular: Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Bahr Al-Jabal, Bahr Al-Ghazal, Lakes, Jonglei, Upper Nile, South/West Kordofan, Blue Nile and Kassala. In addition, the country's borders with Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya and Uganda are considered affected by mines.

The southern part of Sudan where most of the fighting between GOS and SPLA took place is believed to be the center of mine and ERW contamination. Data collected so far indicates that there are few formal minefields, and survey teams observed that mines have not been laid following specific patterns. Rather, potentially important areas, such as bridges or water wells, are believed to be contaminated with landmines. However, the biggest problem in the south is the large amount of AXO and UXO that are found in or near populated areas, on the edges of roads, and around abandoned camps and garrisons. Also, the majority of villages have ammunition supplies that villagers are often reluctant to surrender until they are confident of the peace process.

The locations of sub munitions dropped in the south are very difficult to identify: information on strike locations is sketchy, and fast-growing vegetation makes it nearly impossible to define any "footprints." Sub munitions present a significant danger, particularly if civilians have attempted to clear them.

A complication, adding to the danger posed by ERW, is that the heat renders ammunition more sensitive and rain damages the roof of storage bunkers, increasing the risk of explosion.

In general, the north-except for Kassala - is not heavily affected by landmines. Areas suspected to be mined border the separation line between GOS and SPLM/A forces, which is located south of the Blue Nile and in Kordofan region.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement requires both parties to surrender maps indicating where mines have been laid. GOS has provided maps for certain areas. The SPLA did not systematically map and record mines laid, and consequently it works more on the basis of collective memory for the provision of information on mine emplacement.

Over 2,204 mine/UXO casualties have been recorded in Sudan; the most common activities during which civilians were killed or injured by mines and UXO were traveling, collecting water, food or wood, or tending to livestock. Recorded numbers are believed to substantially understate the actual number of mine/UXO casualties, as many are unlikely to reach hospitals, due to long distances, scarce facilities and lack of transport. In general, people living near dangerous areas are aware of the threat. However, the huge amounts of ERW endanger children who may tamper with them.

Major problems are expected when large numbers of displaced people return to their home areas. Refugees and internally displaced persons are at risk, both in the process of returning on roads, which may be mined, and as they resettle in communities affected by landmines and ERW. They may also cultivate land, not knowing which areas are dangerous. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that around 500,000 to 600,000 refugees in camps in eight neighboring countries will return. Most refugees are expected to return to Western Equatoria, while many refugees currently in Ethiopia are from the Upper Nile and Blue Nile states. An agreement was signed between the government of Sudan Ethiopia and UNHCR for the repatriation of some thousands refugees to Sudan.

Sudan has repeatedly stated that it has not produced, imported or exported antipersonnel mines. Warring parties in Sudan have used at least 12 different types of antipersonnel mines produced by seven countries: Belgium, China, Egypt, India, Israel, Italy and the former Soviet Union.

In the past, the government often stated that it possessed no antipersonnel mine stockpiles and that it destroyed all mines recovered from rebel forces or collected during de-mining.

The October 2004 Article 7 report lists a total of 9,485 stockpiled antipersonnel mines of six types: PMN, POMZ-2, PMD-6 (Soviet Union), TS-50 (Italy), Type 72A (China) and M14 (India). It states that accurate numbers for each type will be provided in the next Article 7 report. In April 2005 they didn't submit the progress report.

Sudan has chosen to retain 5,000 antipersonnel mines for training purposes under Article (3) of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Army Engineer Corps will hold these mines. Sudan states that details of the number and types of mines retained will be in the next Article 7 report, but will include samples of all of the types of mines found in the country.

During 2005, over 254,200 square meters of road were verified, and 2,136,522 square meters of mined areas were cleared by de mining organizations. A total of 988 antipersonnel mines, 231 anti vehicles mine 93,268 small arms munitions rounds and 76,087 UXO were removed.

Since the turn of the century there has been continuous increase in the funding of mine action in Sudan – e.g. 2,2 million US\$ for 1999/2000, 18,2 million US\$ for 2003, 46,9 million dollars for 2005.

Sudan government in 2006 has pledged 2 million US\$ for humanitarian mine action including national capacity building.

5. National Strategic Guidelines for Mine Action:

The newly formed national mine action authority (December 2005) has endorsed the following strategy:

- 5.1 To continue the ongoing mine clearance in priority areas.
- 5.2 To continue dissemination of MRE messages to the communities exposed to direct landmines risks.
- 5.3 Identification, registration and mapping of mine suspected areas with the purpose of assessing the landmines and ERW impact on the affected communities through landmines impact surveys.

- 5.4 Empowerment and expansion of the current national capacities to ensure effective physical, psychological, social and cultural reintegration of war victims.
- 5.5 Empowerment and expansion of the national scope of the mine action frame with the view of making it capable of sound planning, implementing and monitoring all aspects of mine action.
- 5.6 Development and execution of a national strategy for smooth transfer of the mine action ownership from the UN to the national authorities.
- 5.7 Enhancing current ERW (including landmines) survey, clearance, MRE and landmines' survivors support capacities.
- 5.8 Integration of mine action activities within the national recovery, development and public investment policies.
- 5.9 Design and implement a national short and medium term plans for mine action.
- 5.10 Mobilize adequate national and international resource mobilization that should enable realization of the landmines strategic objectives.
- 5.11 Ensuring Sudan honoring its commitments towards the Mine Ban Treaty and other related conventions.

6. JASMAR organization's profile:

Sudan Association for Combating Landmines (JASMAR) is a national mine action and development NGO that is established in November 2001, based in Khartoum with local chapters in Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and the South. JASMAR is envisaging extending its activities to Kassala in Eastern Sudan.

The purposes and objectives for JASMAR establishment are to achieve:

- Confidence building and peace making through mine action particularly cross line initiatives.
- Socio- economic integration of mine affected communities,
- Post-conflict recovery and development.
- Improvement of landmines survivor's lives.

These are to be realized through the following programs and activities:

- Research, database and landmines impacts survey.
- Advocacy for implementation of Ottawa Treaty for Banning Anti-Personal Landmines & other related conventions (The Rights of Persons with Disabilities).
- Mine Risk Education.
- Victim Assistance.
- Mine Clearance.
- Alignment of mine action with the development and humanitarian activities.
- Socio-economic reintegration of landmine survivors.

DCA – following the Nuba Mountains Cease-fire Agreement- signed an agreement with the two Mine Action organizations, JASMAR and OSIL (OSIL is a Sudanese mine action organization based in the Sudan People's Liberation Movement areas). A six weeks joint training in de-mining and Mine Risk Education in the camp and ceremony of graduation took place in (April 2003).

The signing of the Nuba Mountains Cease-fire Agreement (NMCA) on January 2002 has initiated spontaneous backward population movement to the area. That has driven JASMAR to embark on an extensive Mine Risk Reduction Programme which has been undertaken for the last three years. After signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), population have already started to return to their origin. JASMAR has two de-mining teams undertaking diligent work on the ground in Nuba Mountains. The first one established in January 2003 under the fund and supervision of DCA in partnership with OSIL. The other one founded in January 2004, funded from UNMAS/UNOPS under DCA supervision with the above mentioned partner OSIL. JASMAR has MRE team consisting of four persons trained and working under DCA supervision. Another team for EOD (February 2005) also trained under DCA supervision. The organization with its partners in Nuba Mountains (OSIL and DCA) – at the outset - strategized mine action as a tool for peace and confidence building through cross-line activities.

On 2005 JASMAR recruited 20 ex-army officers from the Eng.Corp. Mecaham, who is a South African de-mining company, is a partner of JASMAR in the South. Mecham trained the 20 team in mine clearance and since then are operating outside Juba in Southern Sudan under Mecham's supervision.

JASMAR is also engaged in an Emergency Mine Action Response Project (Phase One) for Community Liaison, Technical Verification and Mine Risk Education in Blue Nile State in collaboration with Mines Advisory Group (MAG). The project trained MRE and community liaison teams.

MAG and JASMAR are partners with Islamic Relief and other organizations in the EC winning consortium in Blue Nile. The project (Sudan Post Conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme) covers Gissan and Kurmuk localities, for three years duration, starts from November 2005. The project will establish and develop a mobile mine action team to respond to the priority clearance needs identified by the community, local authority and consortium partners for safe return and implementation of planned development intervention by the consortium stakeholders . The partners are also implementing a UNICEF supported MRE and preparing to initiate a landmines impact survey (LIS).

JASMAR is currently running MRE project for IDPs in Greater Khartoum. The project aims to reduce the impact of landmines and unexploded ordinance on returnees through sharing pre-return information & reinforcing awareness of safe behaviour during transit or final destinations. The project funded from UNICEF for six months, starting October 2005. Four teams consisting of ten MRE officers and 60 community volunteers are involved. The project targeting is 150,000 internally displaced persons. The project had been extended to White Nile and Darfur to increase the target for 250,000.

JASMAR has moved to Kassala State on 2006 and completed level one survey.

JASMAR has an organization structure composed of General Assembly, Board of Trustees, Executive Secretariat and Local Chapters.

The General Assembly is currently composing of 40 members; the Board of Trustees is composed of 10 members and the Executive Office is composed of 10 full time staff.

The Association has 3 Branches in Nuba Mountains (Kadogli), Southern Sudan in Juba and Blue Nile State (Eldmazeen). Kassala State (Eastern Sudan) chapter is under establishment.

The total staff number of full time in the 3 branches is 47.

7. Environment summary:

- Sudan ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 13 October 2003 and the treaty entered into force on 1 April 2004.
- Sudan Government and SPLA signed a Comprehensive Peace agreement on January 2005.
- On December 24th 2005 a presidential decree no (299) on the formation of the national mine action authority (NMAA) was issued.
- The UN established a National mine action office in Khartoum in September 2002 and a southern Sudan mine action coordination office in Rumbek in February 2003. Now there is a full-fledged mine action authority for the Government of National Unity (GONU).
- Mine clearance and mine risk education activities expanded in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 in the wake of cease-fire agreements and the CPA. A number of surveys and assessments have been carried out in many parts of Sudan especially the South.
- Sudan has conformed to the time frame obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty.
- In 2005, success of surveys and clearance of transport routes and resettlement areas needed for refugees, aid and UN peacekeeping forces. Deming organizations cleared 1,097,595 square meters of land, Verified/cleared 391.1 kilometers of roads , removed or destroyed 441AP mines , 148AT mines and 252384 UXO and small arms.
- On 2005 NGOs & UNICEF Expanded their MRE activities and they provided MRE to 307,205 people- a 60% increase from 2004.
- Funding for mine action in Sudan has increased from a few hundred thousands dollars in 1999 and 2000 to 2.2\$ million in 2001, 5.1 \$million in 2002, 9.5 \$million in 2003, 18.2 \$million in 2004 and 22\$ million in 2005.
- Registered Mine actions actors are 60 NGOs-including 10 INGOs and 5 International Commercial Firms. The UN is responsible for coordination, accreditation, tasking, verification and quality assurance.
- JASMAR – over the last 5 years of its life span - has reflected a sound track record of partnerships with the UN and INGOs.
- Delays in the implementation of the CPA may derail the whole peace process and sets parties to the agreement back to the conflict, with the threat of using landmines again.
- Sudan failing to comply with the time frame obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty is likely negatively impact NGOs activities of mine action.
- There are already emerging signs of donors fatigue affected by global emergencies. This is threatening sustained funding to mine action in Sudan.
- While prospects for durable peace have been created by the CPA, Darfur and eastern Sudan conflicts may cause potential threats vis-à-vis landmines use and Sudan commitment to comply with the Mine Ban Treaty.
- Clear lack of national capacities, up to now, to take the ownership in program management and prioritization.

8. Key issues:

- NNGOs have initiated mine action across the lines of conflict during the war and have led the advocacy process for joining the MBT. Such experience could be rendered for replication in the region similar contexts.
- Sudan has established a national authority with strategic guidelines for mine action in place.
- Still the mine action program in Sudan is a UN lead one under emergency format for 5 years.
- National legislations to help implement the MBT as demanded by the Ottawa convention not yet in place.
- While Sudan government has pledged 2 million US\$, no funding have been released due to lack of priority identification.
- Still mine action funding in Sudan is dependent on conventional western donors. No efforts have been exerted to diversify resource origins.
- NNGOs funding for mine action is primarily channeled through their international counterparts. NNGOs fail to tap resources directly.
- Mine action activities have not been aligned to national development agenda, despite their pivotal role in the recovery of post conflict Sudan and priorities for reintegration of the returnees.
- JASMAR, as a rights-based and development organization, needs to strategize to broaden its scope to realize the integral role of mine action to these issues.
- National capacity development has been identified as a priority need by the Sudanese engaged in mine action.

9. Broad Strategic Frame:

9.1 JASMAR vision:

“A durable peace in Sudan that is free of the scourge of the explosive remnants of war and enjoying sustainable livelihoods”.

9.2 JASMAR mission:

- JASMAR is contributing to the recovery and development of mine affected areas and consolidating peace in Sudan through implementing humanitarian mine action by ensuring meaningful participation of the affected communities and active engagement of the partners.
- JASMAR adopts a rights-based approach throughout including affirmative action towards people with disabilities.

9.3 JASMAR core values:

- Excellence.
- Respect.
- Integrity.
- Sincerity.
- Faith and culture.

9.4 JASMAR principles:

- Good governance (responsibility, accountability, transparency and effectiveness)
- Social justice
- Rights of people

10. Strategic Goals:

- 10.1 ASMAR becomes an independent, recognized and accredited lead national mine action agency in Sudan.
- 10.2 ASMAR becomes a regional resource in Africa for initiation of cross-line/cross-border mine action programs.
- 10.3 ASMAR to establish alliance with national like-minded human security programs like DDR and SALW control.
- 10.4 Effective contribution of JASMAR in peace building and socio-economic recovery of mine affected communities as well as advocacy for the rights of people with disabilities (PWDs).

Summary of the objectives, activities and outcomes

Goal 1:

“JASMAR becomes an independent, recognized and accredited lead national mine action agency in Sudan”.

Objectives	Activities	Outcomes
<p><u>Objective 1.1</u> Sustained managerial and operational capacity development</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training programs. • Office equipments including ICT. • Technical operational equipments. • Increase share of the PSC in • Partnerships agreements. • Maintain and expand national and international partnerships. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management and technical staff acquired necessary skills. • HQ and field capacities well placed in JASMAR. • Fare share of PSC secured.
<p><u>Objective 1.2</u> Expand vertically in mine action pillars and geographically to cover all mine affected areas in northern Sudan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Include victim assistance, stock pile destruction and advocacy for MBT implementation. • Establish presence in eastern Sudan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JASMAR addressing all pillars of mine action. • JASMAR operating in Kassala, Gadaref and Red Sea.
<p><u>Objective 1.3</u> JASMAR to attain professional accreditation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finalize SOP developments. • Ensure staff complying with quality standards. • Attain technical requirements. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JASMAR obtained and maintained technical accreditation.

Goal 2:

“JASMAR becomes a regional resource in Africa for initiation of cross-line/cross-border mine action programs”.

Objectives	Activities	Outcomes
<p><u>Objective 2.1</u> Sudan experience of cross-line initiatives documented</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encourage those who were engaged to spell out their memories. • Plan documentation process. • Tap resources for print out and dissemination. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cross-line mine action experience becomes accessible.
<p><u>Objective 2.2</u> To have informed understanding of the linkage between conflicts and LM use in the region of Africa</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research and field activities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional conflict mapping obtained.

<p><u>Objective 2.3</u> To use LM to initiate cross-line/cross-border dialogue between parties to the conflict</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish linkage between state and non state actors. • Identify neutral bridges for facilitation of communication. • Bring parties to conflict to plan, prioritize and make headway. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parties to the conflict established means of communication. • Parties to the conflict stigmatized use of LM and started along their lines of command to respond positively. • Parties to the conflict explored ways of using LM as an entry to peace and confidence building.
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Goal 3:

“JASMAR to establish alliance with national like-minded human security programs like DDR and SALW control”.

Objectives	Activities	Outcomes
<p><u>Objective 3.1</u> Develop cooperation relationship with the national DDR authority</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review DDR documents and identify DDR components relevant to GASMAR. • Participate in DDR activities. • Attain specific tasking. • Mobilize resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JASMAR accepted by DDR authorities as an active partner. • JASMAR been tasked by specific activities.
<p><u>Objective 3.2</u> To become engaged with the national SALW control program</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiate operational research • Review national policies, laws and guidelines • Expand lm focusing to wider ERW domain. • Establish cooperation with the national program • Create regional and international networking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey reports produced. • National recognition obtained. • Regional and international linkages established. • JASMAR becomes an implementing partner in the national SALW program.

Goal 4:

“Effective contribution of JASMAR in peace building and socio-economic recovery of mine affected communities as well as advocacy for the rights of people with disabilities (PWDs)”.

Objectives	Activities	Outcomes
<u>Objective 4.1</u> To contribute to peace and confidence building among LM affected communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Local conflict mapping.• Establish community liaison within MA.• Integrate peace building within MA and “Do No Harm”.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Local conflict analysis understood.• MA informed and guided by• “Do No Harm” principles.
<u>Objective 4.2</u> To contribute to the socio-economic integration of LM survivors.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Carry out research and create a data-base of LM survivors.• Deliver physical and psychological assistance to LM survivors.• Initiate income generation for LM survivors	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Socio-economic impact of LM assessed.• LM survivors supported physically and psychologically.• Employment opportunities generated for LM survivors.
<u>Objective 4.3</u> Align MA to the ongoing recovery and development programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Create linkage with policy makers and development agencies.• Advocate for the social and economic rights of mine affected communities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Mine affected communities attain their social and economic rights.
<u>Objective 4.4</u> To campaigns for the rights of PWDs	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Review literature and create national networks and link with regional and global networks.• Initiate advocacy campaign	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Positive steps towards realizing the rights of PWDS are seen in the policy changes, attitudes and practises.

Annex 1

No	Name	Organization
1.	Sulaf Aldeen Salih	DDR Commissioner
2.	Awad Basheer	NMAO Director
3.	Hussein Elobid	JASMAR (DG)
4.	Abigail Hartley	MAG (Sudan – cpm)
5.	Valeria Fabbioni	MAG
6.	Philip Halford	MAG
7.	Dave Took ----- Facilitator	LMA
8.	Amin Elfadil	SC Sweden (Sudan-cpm)
9.	Ihsan Hussein	JASMAR Board of Trustees Member
10.	Asia Ahmed	JASMAR Board of Trustees Member
11.	Osman Mekki	SLADO
12.	Abo Osama Abdulah	JASMAR
13.	Abdul Ati Abdul Khair	SCBL
14.	Nazar Mahmoud	ABRAR
15.	Najat Salih	ABRAR
16.	Shaza Njm Aldeen	UNMAS
17.	Rahid Abdulah	RHF
18.	Amal Musa	Journalist
19.	Yousif Osman	MAO
20.	Ahmed Elbakri	NMAO
21.	Luai Galal	UNMAS
22.	Tariq Abdul Fatah	El Zebair Charity
23.	Murtada Abdul Hai	Rufaida Health Foundation (RHF)
24.	Mohammed Elbushra	JASMAR
25.	Babikir Mohammed	JASMAR (BN)
26.	Hamid Ali	JASMAR (NM)
27.	Omer Osman	JASMAR
28.	Ibrahim Jamil Allah	JASMAR
29.	Ishraga Mahjoob	JASMAR
30.	Sama Abdul Majeed	JASMAR
31.	Israa Moh. Elhassan	JASMAR

Annex 2

JASMAR Strategic Planning Workshop
Date: Monday 14th August 2006
Venue: Grand Holiday Villa - Khartoum

Time Frame	9.00 - 09.30	09.30 -10.00	10.00 – 10.30	10.30 -11.30	11.30 - 12.00	12.00 -13.00	13.00 - 14.00	14.00 – 15.00	15.00-16.00
Activity	<p><u>Plenary:</u> Opening session Key note speeches by: - Dr. Solafeddin Salih (DDR Commissioner). - Awad Bashir (NMAO Director)</p>	<p><u>Plenary:</u> Introduction & explanation of W/S Methodology By: - Fr. Hussein Elobeid (JASMAR GM). - Dave Took (LMA)</p>	<p>Coffee break</p>	<p><u>Plenary:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (presentations) • Summary of the HMA in Sudan BY: • Abdulatie Abdulkheir (SCBL Coordinator). • JASMAR profile & plans • By: Aboosama (JASMAR ED). • Floor discussion (facilitator Dave Took) 	<p><u>Plenary:</u> Summary of main considerations by: Dr. Hussein Elobeid (DG JASMAR).</p>	<p><u>Working groups:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conceptual frame & analysis of environment. • Operational frame(policies, strategies, goals and objectives) • Process (result oriented work plan). 	<p><u>Plenary:</u> -The presentations of the groups' work. - Floor discussion Facilitation by: Dave Took.</p>	<p>Lunch Break</p>	<p><u>Plenary:</u> Wrap-up & Closing by: Hasabo Mohamed Abdulrahman (HAC Commissioner)</p>